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ABSTRACT: This paper combines the psychometric methods of paired comparisons and environmental
disposition measurement to explain seemingly lexicographic behavior in choice experiments. A paired
comparison experiment is developed that measures economic values using a choice set composed of
public goods, private goods, and sums of money. The method provides a detailed map of each
respondent’s stated preferences among the choice set elements. Two treatments are used that differ only
on the range of the dollar magnitudes – Treatment A ranges from $10 to $700, Treatment B ranges from
$10 to $9,000. In either treatment, a proportion of the respondents potentially exhibit lexicographic
preferences. The Environmental Response Inventory is used and supplemented with statements regarding
environmental ethics issues. Nine disposition scores are calculated for each respondent. Dispositions of
pastoralism, antiquarianism, and environmental ethicism tend to correlate positively with increasing
preferences for environmental goods, while the disposition of environmental adaptation tended to
negatively correlate with preferences for environmental goods. The marginal effects of environmental
dispositions were largest for people that did not value environmental goods highly (low valuers) and those
that potentially valued the goods lexicographically. The results lend support to the conclusion that people
who tend to hold deontological ethical stances toward the natural environment tend to use noncompensatory decision rules when expressing their values.
KEY WORDS: Environmental Dispositions; Environmental Ethics; Lexicographic Preferences; Paired
Comparisons; Psychometrics
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1. Introduction
Neoclassical utility theory assumes a value monism, i.e., all values are commensurable and
ultimately reducible to a single metric. Based on this metric, we should be able to measure
people’s preferences qua values for environmental goods. However, some people may be using
non-compensatory decision processes when making choices regarding environmental issues.
That is, some people’s values may be formed in a hierarchy; the structure of which being
dependent upon the strength of the attitudes, beliefs, or dispositions they hold and the valuation
context. If someone bases her responses to a valuation exercise from a hierarchy of values, then
she may express her preferences lexicographically – a general unwillingness to trade or accept
compensation for changes in an environmental good. Empirical evidence supporting the
existence of lexicographic preferences for environmental goods is mounting (see Spash 2000 for
a review).

Lexicographic preferences are important to environmental valuation in that they violate the
assumption of continuously defined, differentiable, and convex preferences in standard
neoclassical theory. Value incommensurability denies the ability to map continuously defined
indifference curves among certain values. However, lexicographic preferences may be
compatible with consistent (transitive, complete and reflexive) preference expressions in a
hierarchical model of values (Lockwood 1996; Spash 2000). The traditional treatment of
lexicographic preferences as ‘protest responses’ in economic assessments of values may limit the
scope and quality of the information provided for making policy and social choices (Burney
2000). Lexicographic preferences may be expressed in valuation surveys either as protest bids
(zero or infinite bids), non-response (survey or item), or ‘unreasonable’ sacrifices1. In other
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words, lexicographic preferences are a violation of the exchange value assumption in
neoclassical economics.

Two forms of lexicographic preferences have been offered – strict and modified (Lockwood
1996). Strict lexicographic preferences are the traditional meaning of the concept. That is,
preferences for different types of goods are defined by a lexical ordering of these goods based on
some perceived or felt attribute(s). In a strict lexicon, certain goods in any quantity or quality
always take precedence in our expressions of preferences over all quantities or qualities of other
goods. Thus, no indifference functions are definable. Arguably, the case of strict lexicographic
preferences is untenable (Spash 1998). The absolute priority of one good may imply total
sacrifice on the part of the individual (death before dishonor). A martyr would fit this category,
but this type of individual is very rare.

A more tenable position is offered in the form of modified lexicographic preferences. Tracing
the theoretical history of modified lexicographic preferences back to Georgescu-Roegen (1954),
Lockwood (1996) develops a system of lexicographic preferences based on thresholds. This
argument states that there exist certain thresholds, or minimum levels of a good, that are
necessary and prior to choices for other goods. Figure 1 depicts one possible case of modified
lexicographic preferences between two goods, W and X. Xmin may represent a subsistence level
in consumption of X that ensures human survival. Any level of X below this threshold is
unacceptable. However, once this minimum level is sustained, then a minimum level for W is
invoked. Any point below Wmin but above Xmin is unacceptable based on a secondary threshold
for W. Any point to the northeast of A is strictly preferred to A in that both goods are increasing.
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Any point in the area ABCD is more preferred to point A, because more of the second level good
(W) is obtained while not reducing the first level good (X) below its minimum acceptable level.

There are many factors, both internal and external to a decision or choice context, which can
affect someone’s value expressions (Ajzen and Peterson 1988; Brown and Slovic 1988;
Lockwood 1999). Internal contexts can motivate individuals’ values based on the strength of her
beliefs, attitudes, or dispositions toward the object of valuation (Lockwood 1999). Various
motivations for lexicographic preference expressions identified through stated preference
economic valuation methods have been suggested. The most common of which is the holding of
a deontological or rights-based ethical stance toward natural areas and species (Stevens et al.
1991; Hanley and Milne 1996; Spash 1997, 2000; Lockwood 1998). Other motivations for noncompensatory preference expressions may include dual, non-reducible utility functions (Sen
1977; Etzioni 1988; Sagoff 1988, 1998); amibivalence between hard-to-compare values
(Opaluch and Segerson 1989); inability to commodify environmental goods (Vatn 2000);
religious-cultural doctrines (Earl 1986); or the essentiality of a good (life support priorities)
(Lockwood 1996; Schmidtz 2000). We must also accept the possibility that some people
seemingly expressing lexicographic preferences are actually being inconsistent in their
expressions.

This paper addresses two shortcomings of previous investigations of motivations for
lexicographic preferences expressions. First, most investigations concerning the existence of
lexicographic preferences employ follow-up attitudinal questions in stated preference surveys to
locate respondents into different classifications. These studies are interested in identifying the
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reasons behind why certain individuals respond the way they do. For example, Stevens et al.
(1991) asked respondents about their ethical position toward species (animal rights vs.
utilitarian). However, the options from which respondents may choose are often incomplete or
force them into a position that they weakly hold given the context of the survey (Hanley and
Milne 1996). A more complete attitudinal profile may provide insights into the motivations
behind lexicographic preference expressions. Second, the bid levels or magnitudes of monetary
tradeoffs offered are often within respondents’ ability to pay. That is, respondents with
seemingly lexicographic preferences for a good may be willing to pay an amount (or make
sacrifices) significantly greater than what is involved in the exchange value scenario.

The results provided in this paper are part of a larger project that integrates psychometric and
economic methods of preference measurement (Peterson and Brown 1998). The results are
discussed in the context of defining and relating environmental dispositions (or psychometric
personality scales) with potential lexicographic preferences (PLP) for environmental goods to
monetary gains. Section 2 describes the psychometric method of paired comparisons used to
identify individuals’ stated preferences for the environmental goods included in the experiments.
Respondents also completed the Environmental Response Inventory, a psychometric method of
measuring environmental dispositions (McKechnie 1974). Section 3 describes this method and
the environmental ethics scale that was added to it. Section 4 describes the experimental design.
Section 5 provides association test results between preference rankings and disposition scores.
Section 6 identifies PLPs for the two treatments. We then measure the marginal effects of the
environmental disposition scores on respondent membership in one of four mutually exclusive
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categories – low valuers, moderate valuers, high valuers, and potentially lexicographic valuers
(Section 7).

2. The Method of Paired Comparisons
The method of paired comparisons (PC) is used to elicit binary choices or judgments for paired
items in a choice set (Peterson and Brown 1998). Respondents choose the item in the pair that
has a greater magnitude on a given dimension, whether it is for physical properties such as
weight or psychological properties such as preferences. The individual simply chooses the
preferred element in each pair. If there are no preference errors, and if preferences obey the
axioms of utility theory (especially transitivity and comparability), the result will be a perfect
rank ordering of the elements in the choice set. In our application of the method of paired
comparisons, choices are from the chooser reference point (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This
simply means that each respondent is choosing from amongst alternative gains.

The paired comparison method yields a binary choice score for each pair and a preference score
for each element. The preference score is the number of times the respondent prefers a given
element to other elements in the choice set. A respondent’s vector of preference scores, here
called the preference profile, estimates her preference order among the elements in the choice
set, with larger integers indicating more preferred elements. In this experiment with 20 elements
in the choice set, an individual preference profile with no circular triads contains all 20 integers
from 0 through 19. Circular triads cause some integers to appear more than once (ties) in the
preference profile while others disappear. In this study, we assume that the respondent’s
preference profile estimates her stated preference utility function. Circular triads of the form
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A>B>C>A are the result of inconsistent choices, the causes of which include (1) random
inconsistency when items are very similar, (2) mistakes caused by chooser incompetence or
carelessness, (3) systematic and repeatable intransitivity, and (4) non-compensatory behavior
such as choices that cue on different attributes for different pairings.

We focus on using PC to value a mix of goods. For example, we may be interested in ordering
or measuring economic preferences for a variety of programs under resource constraints. Our
application of PC begins with simple choice problems involving private goods, public goods, and
sums of money. Our current use of the method is to investigate whether labile factors (attitudes,
dispositions) affect people’s expressions of preferences, as suggested by psychologists
(Fischhoff 1991; Schkade and Payne 1994; Slovic 1995). PC may be one method that could be
used to investigate these factors and how they affect individuals’ values for public goods (Clarke
et al. 1999; Lockwood 1999).

3. Measuring Environmental Dispositions
The Environmental Response Inventory (ERI) was developed in the field of environmental
psychology by George McKechnie as a psychometric method for measuring enduring
environmental dispositions. McKechnie (1974) defines environmental dispositions as
“individual differences in the ways people think about and relate to the everyday physical
environment” (pg. 1). In other words, the ERI is a broad personality assessment of humanenvironment interactions.
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The ERI has been applied in different contexts. Domino (1984) used the ERI to investigate
differences in peoples’ willingness to live in a desert environment. Bunting and Cousins (1985)
adapted the ERI to measure children’s environmental dispositions. Zimmermann (1996)
developed a shortened version of the ERI for use in testing environmental dispositions in
children and adults.

The ERI consists of 184 statements that the respondent rates according to how well the statement
describes or applies to her. A five-point Likert-type scale is used, ranging from 1 = strongly
disagree to 5 = strongly agree, with 3 = neutral or don’t know. The statements tap attitudes
toward “a wide array of environmental themes, including conservation, recreation and leisure
activities, architecture and geography, science and technology, urban life and culture, aesthetic
preferences, privacy, and adaptation” (McKechnie 1974, 1). Attitudes are reinforced through
affirmation of positive and negative statements.

Using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis, eight environmental disposition categories
were constructed (McKechnie 1974). Scores for each category are calculated by summing
responses to each of the statements in a category and adding a constant.2 The ERI has been
tested and found to provide valid and reliable measures of environmental dispositions
(McKechnie 1974). Table 1 provides a description of each disposition category and the number
of statements and sign of the statements. Three categories – Pastoralism (PA), Urbanism (UR),
and Environmental Adaptation (EA) – are most strongly related to attitudes toward conservation,
pollution, and urban/natural environments (McKechnie 1974; Bunting and Cousins 1985;
Zimmermann 1996). High scores on PA is positively correlated with membership in
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environmental organizations, whereas high scores on EA is negatively correlated with
membership in environmental organizations (McKechnie 1974).

The statements included in the original ERI may be a little outdated in that they do not account
for advances in technology or newly emerged environmental problems (e.g., no statements
regarding information technology or global environmental problems). However, subsequent
tests have found the ERI to be robust (Domino 1984; Bunting and Cousins 1985). In order to
capture attitudes related to ethical beliefs regarding human-environment interactions, we added
14 statements ranging from issues regarding future generations to animal and ecosystem rights
(Table 2). We have named this category as Environmental Ethics (EE). The addition of this
category is important given the empirical evidence that people do hold a variety of ethical beliefs
that affect their values of the environment (Manning et al. 1998). Scores are calculated using the
same rule as the ERI.

4. Experimental Design
The data are derived from an experiment consisting of two treatments designed to test the
sensitivity of economic measures of value to the range of dollar magnitudes. The sample was
drawn from students at a local university. Table 3 provides brief descriptions of the ten goods.
Table 4 shows the dollar magnitudes used. In Treatment A, 125 respondents made choices
among public goods, among private goods, between public goods and private goods, between
public goods and sums of money, and between private goods and sums of money, with sums of
money ranging from $10 to $700. In Treatment B, 126 respondents made similar choices, but
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with dollar magnitudes ranging from $10 to $9,000. Respondents did not choose between sums
of money, but did respond to the other 145 pairwise combinations among the items.

The private goods are familiar market goods. Two descriptions included suggested retail price;
three did not, as indicated in Table 3. We included private goods to encourage respondents to
consider a wide range of goods and trade-offs, to avoid inducing value by focusing too much
attention on any one good, to examine economic measures for familiar private goods with and
without suggested prices, and to detect apparently irrational choices such as rejecting $700 in
favor of $25 worth of books.

The public goods are of a mixed type. Two are pure public environmental goods (wildlife
habitat and clean environment); i.e., environmental goods that are non-rival and non-excludable
in consumption. The other public goods are excludable by nature, but stated as non-excludable
by policy. They are also non-rival until demand exceeds capacity. The pure public
environmental goods benefit all people in the broader community, whereas the other public
goods benefit only the group represented by respondents (college students). Respondents had
Table 3 in front of them during the experiment and were free to refer to it at any time. The
public and private goods used in the experiment were tested in pilot studies and selected to
represent a substantial range of value. Respondents were asked to choose one or the other item
from each pair under the assumption that either would be provided at no cost to the respondent.
Each respondent also completed the ERI plus the environmental ethics addendum.
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The experiment was administered by a computer program that presented pairs of items on the
monitor in random order for each respondent. Short names for the goods and monetary
magnitudes appeared side-by-side, with their position (right versus left) also randomized. The
respondent recorded each choice by pressing the right or left arrow key and corrected mistakes
by pressing the ‘backspace’ key. At the end of the paired comparisons, the ERI was immediately
administered. Each statement appeared on the screen with the Likert-scale displayed beneath.
The respondent expressed how the statement described or applied to her by pressing one of the
number keys from 1 to 5 coinciding with the Likert-scale used. Following the ERI, the 14
environmental ethics statements were presented and evaluated using the same response mode as
the ERI.

The computer program recorded the respondent’s choice for each pair in an ordered binary
matrix and responses to the ERI, among other things such as response time for pairwise choices
and sequence number of each pairing. The computer program administered paired comparisons
enables a detailed mapping of an individual’s preference profile in an efficient manner (Peterson
and Brown 1998; Lockwood 1998). The average total time to complete the survey was about 30
minutes, not including the time required to become familiar with the goods and the computer
program.

5. Associations between Preference Scores and Disposition Scores
Spearman’s nonparametric correlations are calculated to test for associations between the
preference scores and disposition scores. The null hypothesis is that the correlation coefficient
(r) is equal to zero and the alternative hypothesis is that r is not equal to zero, thus providing a
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two-tailed test of significance. Table 5 reports those correlations that reject the null hypothesis
of no association at the 0.10 level or better. The magnitude of r indicates the strength of the
association with higher values representing stronger association. r can range from 1 to –1 with
either of these values showing two variables are perfectly correlated. The sign of r indicates the
direction of the association.

Pastoralism (PA) disposition scores are positively correlated with preference scores for the two
environmental goods (WLD and CLN). This association is expected since PA represents an
individual’s disposition toward land development and preservation. An Antiquarian (AN)
disposition is also positively correlated with WLD and CLN, potentially meaning that in addition
to the general disposition toward cultural aesthetics and history, people also include natural
aesthetics and history (Thompson 2000). Environmental Ethics (EE) dispositions have the
strongest associations, especially for preference scores regarding wildlife habitat (WLD). This
disposition entails ethical sensitivities toward future generations, non-human life, and natural
systems. This association is as expected.

Scores for Environmental Adaptation (EA) dispositions, which is the modification of natural
environments, are negatively correlated with preference scores for the environmental goods. In
addition, EA is positively correlated with the parking garages public good (PRK). This
correlation is affirmed with the negative association of PRK values with EE in Treatment B.
Scores for dispositions toward the Urban environment (UR) are negatively correlated with values
for WLD in Treatment A and CLN in Treatment B. However, this evidence also suggests that
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people may be able to appreciate the built environment and the natural environment if they are
not in competition with one another (Thompson 2000).

In general, dispositions that are significantly correlated with both private and public goods
showed associations of the opposite direction. This may mean that individual’s who highly
value private, consumable goods do not place high values on public goods. A test of association
between the disposition scores and memberships in environmental organizations confirms
McKechnie’s (1974) findings. Positive correlations with PA (0.34; 0.27, respectively) and EE
(0.32; 0.26, respectively) for Treatments A and B, and a negative correlation with EA (-0.31) for
Treatment A were found in this experiment.

6. Identifying Potential Lexicographic Preferrers
Beginning with this section, we identify respondents who are potentially lexicographic preferrers
of goods. The next section conducts regression analysis to test for significant covariate effects
between disposition scores and membership in different value classes and to measure the
marginal effects of dispositions on membership in the different value classes.

We identify potential lexicographic preferrers (PLP) using the following rule:

ì1 if PS good i >> PS Max $
.
PLP = í
î 0 if PS good i £ PS Max $

(1)

In other words, if a respondent’s preference score for a good (PSgood) is strictly greater than her
preference score for the largest dollar magnitude (PSMax$), then she prefers the good to all sums
of money offered. We call this individual a potential lexicographic preferrer (PLP) because her
exchange value for the good in terms of money may be greater than the largest dollar amount
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offered. That is, the largest dollar amount offered in trade or compensation for the good may not
be high enough (although $9,000 in Treatment B has a high opportunity cost). Arguably, our
instrument does not differentiate between true lexicographic preferrers and those for whom a
high enough price has not been reached. Nonetheless, the next section statistically tests whether
these potential lexicographic preferrers differ on dimensions of environmental dispositions from
people that place a high monetary value on environmental goods. Table 6 reports the number
and proportion of respondents identified as PLP for all goods between both treatments.

The environmental public goods exhibit the largest proportions of PLP with 26 percent and 18
percent of Treatment A respondents and 16 percent and 9 percent of Treatment B respondents
being PLP for WLD and CLN, respectively. The magnitude of the proportions of PLP for all
public goods declines when the dollar magnitude increases from $700 to $9,000.3 This supports
Hanley and Milne’s (1996) finding that self-proclaimed lexicographic preferrers become
compensatory choosers when the stakes (opportunity costs) are raised. We also identified those
individuals who preferred the goods to $700 in Treatment B (Table 6, 4th column). Although the
distributions between the three proportions are not significantly different, their magnitudes differ
with Treatment A most closely matching the $700 proportions of Treatment B.

As an anonymous reviewer noted, in Treatment B there is some fraction of people that hold
compensatory values greater than $700 (33 percent for WLD). Some of these people may hold
lexicographic values. As the opportunity cost is increased to $9,000, a larger proportion of
people who hold compensatory values are identified (84 percent for WLD). It is possible that all
of the respondents hold compensatory values; we just have not reached a high enough price. We
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will address this issue when we compare the potentially lexicographic preferrers with the ‘high
valuers’ identified in the next section.

7. Marginal Effects of Disposition Scores on Value Classifications

In this section, we report the effects of environmental dispositions on membership in four value
classes using ordered probit regression analyses. We re-classify individuals as being members of
a particular value class (Mj) using the following rule, where PSgood are preference scores as
previously defined:
0 if PS goodi < 11
ì
ï
1 if 11 £ PS good i £ 15
ï
.
Mj =í
ï2 if PS good i > 15(& ~ M = 3)
ïî 3 if PS good i >> PS Max $

(2)

That is, membership in class j (Mj) is 0 if the respondents are low valuers of good i; 1 if they are
moderate valuers of the good, 2 if they are high valuers of the good, and 3 if they are potential
lexicographic valuers of the good. Each category is mutually exclusive in that if a respondent
has membership in Class 3, then she cannot be a member in any of the other value classes. High
valuers (Class 2) expressed a high value for the good, but still preferred some amount of money
over the good.

The construction of the value classes follows the natural order of increasing expressed values for
the goods. The appropriate regression method for polychotomous dependent variables of this
sort is the ordered probit or ordered logit. There is no significant difference between the
marginal effects derived from either method, so we choose the ordered probit since it is more
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straightforward in interpretation of its covariate effects. The ordered probit model specifies an
unobservable index of degree of value (M*) to be a function of certain explanatory variables:
M* = a + bx + e ,

(3)

where x will be the disposition scores, a is a constant, e is an error term that is normally
distributed, and b are the covariates to be estimated. The ordered probit calculates the
probability of membership in Class 0 (M = 0) if M* £ d1, Class 1 if d1 £ M* £ d2, Class 2 if d2 £
M* £ d3, and Class 3 if d3 £ M*. The d’s are threshold parameters that are estimated along with
a and the b’s. d1 is normalized by setting it to zero when a constant term is included in the

ordered probit model.

Table 7 reports the results of the ordered probit analyses for the wildlife habitat (WLD) good for
both treatments. The threshold values (d’s) are significant in both models meaning there is a
discernible difference between the value classes. PA, EA, and EE dispositions significantly
affect membership in the different classes for Treatment A, and EA and EE significantly affect
class membership for Treatment B. The signs of these effects are as expected, with higher scores
for PA and EE increasing membership in the higher classes for the good, and higher scores for
EA decreasing membership in the higher classes for the good.

Significant b’s in the ordered probit models provide some information regarding the effects of
the disposition scores on class membership, but this information is limited. A significant
covariate such as bEE tells us that higher scores on EE definitely increases membership in Class
3 and definitely decreases membership in Class 0. However, the effect on membership in the
intermediate classes is unknown. Therefore, a fuller picture of the effects of disposition scores is
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provided through estimation of the marginal effects of the scores on class membership. Marginal
effects are the change in the probability of membership in a specific class due to a change in the
disposition score. Higher marginal effects mean larger changes in the probability of class
membership.

Table 8 reports the marginal effects of the disposition scores on the probability of membership in
each of the value classes. The general pattern across all marginal effects is that the greatest
effects are for the polar extreme value classes (Class 0 and Class 3). For Class 1, the marginal
effects are generally negligible. The marginal effects of EA and EE are strongest for
determining membership in Class 0 (low valuers) for the environmental goods, although the
effect is strong for membership in Class 3 (PLP). The sign of the marginal effects generally
switches as we move out of Class 0 into Class 1. One may assume from the analysis that
disposition scores may perform better at identifying low valuers than PLP. However, we caution
against this interpretation given that our PLP class (Class 3) may contain high valuers (Class 2) if
the range of dollar values was not high enough for some people. Which brings us back to the
issue that arose at the end of the previous section. Are we really identifying people with
lexicographic preferences, or is our price range still too low to elicit compensatory values?

One way to directly address this issue would be to have respondents self-report whether they are
lexicographic preferrers or not. As the anonymous reviewer suggested, we could have asked
close-ended questions such as ‘no monetary payment is sufficient’ when choosing between
environmental goods and personal gain. Unfortunately, we did not ask such a question, although
Hanley and Milne (1996) show that literal responses such as these may be dependent on the
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magnitude of the tradeoff being offered. What we do have are our individual environmental
ethics statements. Based on Mann-Whitney U tests of mean equality, PLP respondents differ
significantly from high valuers on EE scores. In particular, this difference in EE scores is based,
in part, on PLP respondents rating the following three individual statements significantly higher
than the high valuers:
1. “Natural ecosystems have a right to exist for their own sake, regardless of human
concerns and uses.”
2. “We should try to get by with a little less so there will be more left for future
generations.”
3. “Unique environments should be protected at all costs.”
Although this additional evidence does not definitively identify that there are lexicographic
preferrers in our sample for the wildlife habitat good in Treatment B, the theme of two of the
above statements is consistent with arguments that deontological ethical stances toward the
environment may lead to lexicographic expressions of value for these kinds of goods (Stevens et
al. 1991; Hanley and Milne 1996; Spash 1997, 2000; Lockwood 1998).

8. Conclusions

Attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions toward people, places and things can affect how people
behave and respond to questions (Ajzen and Peterson 1988). This is true for economic surveys
of people’s values of environmental goods. This study combines psychology, economics and
ethics through the use of the psychometric methods of paired comparisons to measure economic
value and a slightly modified version of the Environmental Response Inventory to measure
dispositions toward the environment. The main goal is to explain seemingly lexicographic

19

valuation behavior evident in economic surveys of environmental issues (Spash 2000). What
this study shows is that, relative to the other elements in the choice set, environmental goods
elicit more potentially lexicographic responses than other public goods. People who seemingly
express their preferences lexicographically have stronger dispositions toward the environment,
which is reflected in how, and not necessarily how much, they value the environment. If people
are heterogeneous in how they express their preferences, then estimating values for the entire
population of affected people with a single metric is problematic.

A method of paired comparisons is developed that elicits binary choices between the elements of
a choice set composed of private goods, public goods, and sums of money. The result is a
detailed map of each respondent’s stated preferences for each element. Two treatments are
employed that differ solely in the range of the dollar magnitudes (Treatment A ranges from $10
to $700 and Treatment B ranges from $10 to $9,000). For the two environmental public goods –
wildlife habitat preserve and improved air and water quality arrangement – 26 percent and 18
percent of respondents (respectively) in Treatment A exhibited potentially lexicographic
preferences, whereas 16 percent and 9 percent of Treatment B respondents (respectively)
exhibited potentially lexicographic preferences for these goods. As the opportunity cost
increases, we see a decline in the number of respondents self-reporting strict lexicographic
preferences (Hanley and Milne 1996). These people may be operating from a modified
lexicographic rule that constrains the lexicon within thresholds (Lockwood 1996).

The Environmental Response Inventory measures an individual’s disposition toward the
environment across eight categories (McKechnie 1974). We developed an additional category
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that measured environmental ethics dispositions regarding future generations, non-human life,
and ecosystem functioning. Pastoralism, antiquarianism, and environmental ethicism
dispositions are positively associated with positive values for the environmental goods, whereas
the environmental adaptation disposition is negatively associated with positive environmental
values. This implies that people who tend to be pro-environment (want to preserve natural
resources, find aesthetic beauty in natural surroundings, hold ethical commitments toward
natural entities) may be more likely to use non-compensatory decision rules.

The marginal effects of dispositions on membership in four value classes – low valuers,
moderate valuers, high valuers, and potentially lexicographic valuers – were most significant in
defining the polar extremes. Low valuers tended to be low scorers for pastorialism,
antiquarianism and environmental ethicism dispositions. Potential lexicographic valuers tended
to be high scorers on these dispositions. Low valuers also tended to have high environmental
adaptation disposition scores, while potential lexicographic valuers tended to score low on this
disposition. The marginal effects for moderate and high valuers of the environmental goods
tended to be miniscule for all dispositions.

There are several extensions for this research, some of which have been addressed throughout
the paper. One of the more important extensions is overcoming the criticism that we have not
identified lexicographic preferrers, but merely have not exceeded their value threshold for
trading environmental goods for monetary gain. One method that could be used is to ask people
to self-report whether they would choose any amount of money. Another method would be to
increase the range of sums of money well beyond the $9,000 included in this experiment. Both

21

methods, however, are probably inadequate in that there are problems with self-reporting and
how large the highest sum of money reasonably could be. A second extension is to apply the
method to other populations beyond college students.
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Footnotes
1

The definition of ‘unreasonable’ sacrifices is greatly dependent upon how you define rational

choices. In the context of a neoclassical definition of instrumental rationality, unreasonableness
may include willingness-to-pay expressions beyond an individual’s ability to pay, reductions in
standard-of-living below subsistence levels, or other sacrifices that involve large opportunity
costs such as loss of human life.
1

The constant for each category is six times the number of negative items in that category,

ensuring there are no negative total raw scores.
1

The increases in PLP for the private goods (CLO and BOK) between Treatment A and B is due

to one individual in Treatment B preferring all private goods over money and public goods
(except for the low valued MEA). This individual obviously was playing a different game in that
he or she could have purchased large quantities of each private good by accepting the money.
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Table 1. ERI Environmental Disposition Categories.

Category
PA

UR
EA

SS
ET

AN

NP
MO

Theme for High Scorers
Patoralism: Opposition to land development; concern about
population growth; preservation of natural resources, including open
space; acceptance of natural forces as shapers of human life;
sensitivity to pure environmental experiences; self-sufficiency in the
natural environment.
Urbanism: Enjoyment of high density living; appreciation of
unusual and varied stimulus patterns of the city; interest in cultural
life; enjoyment of interpersonal richness and diversity.
Environmental Adaptation: Modification of the environment to
satisfy needs and desires, and to provide comfort and leisure;
opposition to governmental control over private land use; preference
for highly designed or adapted environments; use of technology to
solve environmental problems; preference for stylized
environmental details.
Stimulus Seeking: Interest in travel and exploration of unusual
places; enjoyment of complex and intense physical sensations;
breadth of interests.
Environmental Trust: General environmental openness,
responsiveness, and trust; competence in finding one’s way about
the environment vs. fear of potentially dangerous environments;
security of home; fear of being alone and unprotected.
Antiquarianism: Enjoyment of antiques and historical places;
preference for traditional vs. modern design; aesthetic sensitivity to
man-made environments and to landscape; appreciation of cultural
artifacts of earlier eras; tendency to collect objects for their
emotional significance.
Need for Privacy: Need for physical isolation from stimuli;
enjoyment of solitude; dislike of neighboring; need for freedom
from distraction.
Mechanical Orientation: Interest in mechanics in its various forms;
enjoyment in working with one’s hands; interest in technological
processes and basic principles of science; appreciation of the
functional properties of objects.

Adapted from McKechnie (1974).

# Variables
(sign)
20 (+)
2 (-)

11 (+)
9 (-)
16 (+)
6 (-)

20 (+)
2 (-)
20 (-)

16 (+)
4 (-)

15 (+)
4 (-)
17 (+)
3 (-)
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Table 2. Environmental Ethics Statements Supplementary to Environmental Response
Inventory (Category EE).
Statement
It is not necessary to protect every endangered plant and animal.
Current generations should make sacrifices for future generations.
I am glad that there are wilderness areas, even if I never get to visit them.
Endangered wildlife species should be protected at any cost.
I would support the protection of an endangered bird species, even if I were never able
to see one in the wild.
6. Future generations are not as important as the current one in decisions about natural
resources.
7. Trapping of wild animals should be banned.
8. Natural ecosystems have a right to exist for their own sake, regardless of human
concerns and uses.
9. Wild plants and animals have a right to live unmolested by humans.
10. Land should NOT be set aside for parks and wilderness areas if it will cost people
their jobs.
11. I enjoy knowing that I can visit parks and wilderness areas if I want to.
12. We should try to get by with a little less so there will be more left for future
generations.
13. Unique environments should be protected at all costs.
14. I think that we are doing an adequate job of protecting natural resources from being
used up.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Likert scale: 1=most strongly disagree; 3=neutral; 5=most strongly agree.

Sign
+
+
+
+

+
+
+
+
+
+
-
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Table 3. Description of Goods.
Public Good
Video Library (VID)

Parking Garages
(PRK)

Eating Area (EAT)
Air-Water Quality
(CLN)

Wildlife Habitat
(WLD)
Private Goods
Meal Ticket (MEA)
Entertainment Ticket
(ENT)

Clothing Certificate
(CLO)
Airline Certificate
(AIR)
Bookstore Certificate
(BOK)

Description
A no-fee library service that provides videotapes of all course lectures
so that students can watch tapes of lectures for classes they are not
able to attend.
Parking garages to increase parking capacity on campus such that
students are able to find a parking place at any time, without waiting,
within a five-minute walk of any building at no increase in the existing
parking permit fee.
Expansion of the eating area in the Lory Student Center to ensure that
any student can find a seat at any time.
A cooperative agreement between Colorado State University, local
business groups, and the citizens of the community that would ensure
the air and water quality of Fort Collins would be at least as clean as
the cleanest 1% of the communities in the U.S.
Purchase by Colorado State University of 2,000 acres of land in the
mountains west of Fort Collins as a wildlife refuge for animals native
to Colorado.

A meal at a Fort Collins restaurant of your choice.
Two tickets and transportation to one of the following:
·
A concert of your choice in Denver (contemporary, rock, or
classical), or
·
General admission to a sporting event (Broncos, Rockies,
Avalanche, or Nuggets)
A nontransferable $200 certificate for clothing at a Fort Collins store of
your choice.
A nontransferable certificate for a round-trip flight to any major city in
the contiguous 48 states on an airline of your choice.
A $25 gift certificate for use at a bookstore of your choice.
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Table 4. Dollar Magnitudes Used in the Experiment.
Dollars
$10
$30
$50
$70
$100
$200
$300
$400
$500
$700
$1,000
$3,000
$9,000

Treatment
A
B
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Table 5. Spearman’s Nonparametric Correlation Tests of Association between Disposition
Scores and Preference Scores.
Disposition
PA
UR
EA
AN
NP
MO
EE

Significantly Correlated with Good (r)
Treatment A
WLD (0.43)
CLN (0.31)
CLO (-0.29)
VID (0.18)
WLD (-0.19)
MEA (0.18)
WLD (-0.51)
CLN (-0.36)
CLO (0.29)
PRK (0.26)
WLD (0.29)
BOK (0.24)
CLN (0.18)
ENT (-0.20)
BOK (0.24)
WLD (0.50)
CLN (0.41)
CLO (-0.34)

PA
UR
EA
AN
NP
EE

WLD (0.39)
MEA (0.22)
WLD (-0.35)
WLD (0.39)
CLO (-0.21)
WLD (0.44)

Treatment B
CLN (0.26) MEA (-0.19)
CLN (-0.21)
AIR (0.20)
CLN (-0.30)
CLO (0.28)
CLN (0.31)
CLO (-0.25)
PRK (-0.19)
PRK (-0.21)
CLN (0.20)

MEA (-0.23)

The null hypothesis that r=0 is rejected at a significance level of 0.05 or better based on two-tailed tests of
significance. The size of r tells the magnitude of the association and the sign of r tells the direction of this
association. r can range from –1 to 1.
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Table 6. Proportion of Respondents Potentially Expressing Lexicographic Preferences.

Dollar Amount
Public Good
WLD
CLN
EAT
PRK
VID
Private Good
AIR
CLO
MEA
ENT
BOK

Treatment A
(n=124)
$700
Number (%)
32 (26%)
23 (18%)
1 (1%)
11 (9%)
7 (6%)

4
0
0
2
0

(3%)
(0%)
(0%)
(2%)
(0%)

Treatment B
(n=124)
$9000
Number (%)
20 (16%)
11 (9%)
0 (0%)
4 (3%)
2 (2%)

1
1
0
2
1

(1%)
(1%)
(0%)
(2%)
(1%)

$700
Number (%)
41 (33%)
28 (22%)
5 (4%)
12 (10%)
7 (6%)

21
2
1
11
1

(17%)
(2%)
(1%)
(9%)
(1%)

Identification Rule: Potential Lexical Preference if and only if preference score for goodx > preference score for
dollar amounty.
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Table 7. Ordered Probit Analysis of Environmental Disposition Scores – Wildlife Habitat.

Variable
PA
UR
EA
SS
ET
AN
NP
MO
CO
EE
Constant
d2
d3
Log likelihood
Chi-square

Treatment A
(n=124)
Coefficient Std. Error
0.0270*
0.0168
0.0050
0.0130
-0.0390*
0.0137
0.0014
0.0142
0.0098
0.0169
-0.0034
0.0132
0.0171
0.0150
-0.0118
0.0104
0.0007
0.0189
0.0386*
0.0168
-2.1368
2.1408
0.7359*
0.1280
1.1805*
0.1677
-141.23
44.20*

Treatment B
(n=124)
Coefficient Std. Error
0.0257
0.0212
0.0123
0.0106
-0.0400*
0.0135
-0.0144
0.0147
0.0073
0.0151
0.0160
0.0127
0.0002
0.0134
0.0135
0.0102
-0.0228
0.0201
0.0584*
0.0202
-2.1508
1.8998
1.4067*
0.1815
1.9635*
0.2057
-133.59
52.03*

* Significant at the 0.10 level or better based on asymptotic t-statistics.
Note: The dependent variable is based on membership in one of four mutually exclusive classifications defined as 0
= ratings < 11; 1 = rating of 11 to 15; 2 = rating > 15; 3 = WLD > MaxDollar (potential lexicographic preference
identifier rule). Membership per class is: Treatment A (48, 28, 16, 32); and Treatment B (38, 50, 16, 20),
respectively.

35

Table 8. Marginal Effects of Environmental Disposition Scores on Class Membership –
Treatments A and B Ordered Probit Analyses for Wildlife Habitat.
Variable
PA
UR
EA
SS
ET
AN
NP
MO
CO
EE

Class 0
A
B
-0.0101
-0.0082
-0.0019
-0.0039
0.0146
0.0128
-0.0005
0.0046
-0.0037
-0.0023
0.0013
-0.0051
-0.0064
-0.0001
0.0044
-0.0043
-0.0003
0.0073
-0.0144
-0.0187

Class 1
A
B
0.0001
0.0004
0.0000
0.0002
-0.0001 -0.0006
0.0000 -0.0002
0.0000
0.0001
0.0000
0.0003
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0002
0.0000 -0.0004
0.0001
0.0009

Class 2
A
B
0.0023
0.0034
0.0004
0.0016
-0.0034
-0.0052
0.0001
-0.0019
0.0009
0.0010
-0.0003
0.0021
0.0015
0.0000
-0.0010
0.0018
0.0001
-0.0030
0.0034
0.0077

Class 3
A
B
0.0077
0.0044
0.0014
0.0021
-0.0111 -0.0069
0.0004 -0.0025
0.0028
0.0013
-0.0010
0.0028
0.0049
0.0000
-0.0034
0.0023
0.0002 -0.0039
0.0110
0.0100

The value classifications are based on membership in one of four mutually exclusive classifications defined as 0 =
ratings < 11; 1 = rating of 11 to 15; 2 = rating > 15; 3 = WLD > MaxDollar (potential lexicographic preference
identifier rule).
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Figure 1. Strict and Modified Lexicographic Preferences (adapted from Spash 1998).
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